Abstract

The Indian farmer, including their counterparts in some developed countries, fell in debt-trap even as GDP and food prices soared and many sectors of the economy shared benefits of GDP growth. Apparently, none of the systems—colonial, socialist, or market-based—have tools to share economic prosperity with the farmer. The paper simulates steps in order to experimentally demonstrate that there could be very high risk in agricultural production. Finally, it proceeds to outline architecture of a centralized digital market, different from existing forms of markets available to the farmer, which addresses such risk as is associated with payoff from agriculture.

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